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Troubled Real Estate Leasing Companies Trapped
Within the Personal Holding Company Income Tax
Provisions
The personal holding company provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code1 have many times proved to be a "snare for the
~ n w a r y . "The
~ corporate taxpayer has often assumed that since
it is not a passive investment company it is immune from the
seventy-percent personal holding company tax.3 The expunging
personal holding company tax provisions, however, have unfortunately swept within their reach certain types of operating real
estate ~ompanies.~
In the recent case of Parkside, Inc. v. Commis~ioner,~
the
president of Parkside and its sister corporation, both of whose
assets consisted primarily of duplex homes, struggled for five
years to profitably manage the corporations by renting the duplexes."fter
continual losses, he sold the duplexes separately
through real estate agents. The sales eventually resulted in sub1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "Code" or "Section(s)" refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
The personal holding company provisions of the Code comprise I.R.C. # § 541-547. The
Tax Court once termed these sections as an "irritatingly convoluted statutory path."
Pleasanton Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 510, 516 (1975) (footnote omitted), aff'd
per curiam, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1978).
2. Barsanti, A Snare for the Unwary: The Personal Holding Company Tax and Real
Estate Holding Companies, 22 Mo. B.J. 112, 112 (1966).
3. For an excellent discussion of operating technology companies that can be subjected to the personal holding company tax because of the royalties provision, (I.R.C. Ji
543(b)(4)), see Morgan, The Domestic Technqlogy Base Company: The Dilemma of An
Operating Company Which Might Be a Personal Holding Company, 33 TAXL. REV.233
( 1978).
4. In Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1939), one of the first cases to narrate
the personal holding company legislative history, the court noted,
It not infrequently happens that legislative bodies, with specific instances of
abuse in mind, phrase tax legislation in such broad terms as to include persons
or groups of persons not specifically contemplated. . . . In the present instance
it was pointed out at the committee hearings that the term "personal holding
company" was so broadly defined that legitimate operating companies might be
subjected to its provisions.
Id. it 208 (footnote omitted).
5. 571 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1977).
6. Three brothers and a sister inherited the stock of Parkside in 1960 upon their
father's death. Its principal assets consisted of 26 duplexes. Beaconcrest, the sister corporation, was formed in 1960 to receive part of the assets from a corporation previously
organized by the father. Beaconcrest's assets consisted primarily of 21 duplexes. Id. at
1093.
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stantial interest income from installment payments. The Commissioner determined that since the corporations were not in the
business of selling duplexes, the interest was ordinary interest
and the corporations fell within the personal holding company
provisions. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's judgment,' but on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed.' Explicitly relying on the capital asset criteria of section 1221(1),9the court held
that the corporations were primarily in the business of selling
duplexes and hence the interest income should be classified as
"rents" under section 543(b)(3).
A brief outline of the mechanics of the personal holding company provisions illustrates the difficulty of analyzing the application of the tax. Complex formulas and definitions1° provide that
a corporation will be considered a personal holding company for
tax purposes if: personal holding company incornell is at least
7. Parkside, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M;(CCH) 54 (1975), reu'd, 571 F.2d 1092
(9th Cir. 1977).
8. 571 F.2d at 1096.
9. The court briefly stated, "[Wle can divine no reason to construe the thrust of
these passages differently. We will, therefore, turn to section 1221(1)cases for guidance."
Id. at 1094 (footnote omitted).
10. One commentator has ably stated:
Even prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, the personal holding company provisions constituted a maze of complex definitions, percentage tests pyramided one
on another, and exceptions phrased in statutory detail which defied understanding-even by tax experts. The 1964 Act has greatly magnified these difficulties
by piecemeal tinkering designed to curb tax avoidance. Such tinkering not only
has complicated the provisions to a much greater degree by departing from
familiar accounting standards, but it has also created a serious risk of imposing
this severe penalty on active business operations.
Nolan, Personal Holding Companies Under the 1
eAct: A Maze of Arbitrary Standards,
1965 TUL.TAXINST.171, 171 (footnote omitted).
The Tax Court has also referred to these sections as "exasperatingly complex statutory provisions." Bell Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.766, 775, aff'd mem., 546
F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1976).
11. The applicable portions of I.R.C. 8 543(a), defining personal holding company
income, provide:
(a) GENERAL
RULE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "personal
holding company income" means the portion of the adjusted ordinary gross
income which consists of:
ETC.-Dividends, interest, royalties . . . and
(1) DIVIDENDS,
annuities. This paragraph shall not apply to(A) interest constituting rent (as defined in subsection
W(3)) . . . .

....

(2) -.-The
adjusted income from rents; except that such adjusted income shall not be included if(A) such adjusted income constitutes 50 percent or more
of the adjusted ordinary gross income, and
(B) the sum of-
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sixty percent of the adjusted ordinary gross income,12 and not
more than five individuals own directly or indirectly more than
fifty percent of the outstanding stock.13Interest on a debt for real
(i) the dividends paid during the taxable year . . . ,
(ii) the dividends considered as paid on the last day
of the taxable year . . . , and
(iii) the consent dividends for the taxable year . . . ,
equals or exceeds the amount, if any, by which the personal holding company
income for the taxable year (computed without regard to this paragraph and
paragraph (6),and computed by including as personal holding company income
copyright royalties and the adjusted income from mineral, oil, and gas royalties)
exceeds 10 percent of the ordinary gross income.
Also included in the definition of personal holding company income in paragraphs (3)
through (8) of subsection (a) of 9 543 are: mineral, oil, and gas royalties; copyright royalties; produced film rents; compensation for corporate property used by shareholders;
personal service contracts; and estates, trusts, and beneficiaries.
12. Ordinary gross income, adjusted ordinary gross income, and adjusted income
from rents are defined in I.R.C.9 543(b):
GROSS INCOME.-T~~
term "ordinary gross income" means
(1) ORDINARY
the gross income determined by excluding(A) all gains from the sale or other disposition of capital assets,
(B) all gains (other than those referred to in subparagraph (A))
from the sale or other disposition of property described in section
1231(b) . . .

....

(2) ADJUSTED
ORDINARYGROSS INCOME.--T~~
term "adjusted ordinary gross
income" means the ordinary gross income adjusted as follows:
(A) RENTS.-From the gross income from rents (as defined in
the second sentence of paragraph (3) of this subsection) subtract the
amount allowable as deductions for(i) exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, and amortization of property other than tangible personal property which
is not customarily retained by any one lessee for more than
three years,
(ii) property taxes,
(iii) interest, and
(iv) rent,
to the extent allocable, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
to such gross income from rents. . . .

....

(3) ADJUSTED
INCOME FROM R E N T S . - T ~term
~
"adjusted income from
rents" means the gross income from rents, reduced by the amount subtracted
under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "rents" means compensation, however designated, for the use
of, or right to use, property, and the interest on debts owed to the corporation,
to the extent such debts represent the price for which real property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business was sold
or exchanged by the corporation . . . .
13. The two basic requirements are listed in I.R.C. § 542(a):
(a) GENERAL
RULE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "personal holding company" means any corporation (other than a corporation described in subsection (c)) if-
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estate may be characterized as either ordinary interest or, if the
real estate is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business, as rents." While ordinary interest is
always included in personal holding company income, rents may
be excluded from personal holding company income if the adjusted income from rents is more than fifty percent of the adjusted ordinary gross income. Therefore, if a real estate company's only income is considered ordinary interest, a personal
holding company will result.15 On the other hand, if the interest
can be classified as rents under section 543(b)(3) the company
will not be treated as a personal holding company.16
This Comment discusses three alternative methods of applying section 543(b)(3). The Tax Court's opinion in Parkside illustrates a mechanical approach-a strict statutory construction
without regard to corporate intentions-a position that has often
been taken by courts in determining personal holding company
status. The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court in Parkside,
used a second alternative by employing section 1221(1) criteria to
(1) ADJUSTEDORDINARYGROSS INCOMEREQUIREMENT.-At
least 60percent of
its adjusted ordinary gross income (as defined in section 543(b)(2)) for the
taxable year is personal holding company income (as defined in section 543(a)),
and
(2) STOCKOWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT.-At
any time during the last half of
the taxable year more than 50 percent in value of its outstanding stock is owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for not more than 5 individuals.
14. See I.R.C.8 543(a)(1), (b)(3).
15. For purposes of this Comment, a brief equation summary of the interest calculation can be made:
Personal Holding Company Income (PHCI) =
(1) dividends, interest, royalties, annuities, and
(2) rents, unless the adjusted income from rents 2 50% of the adjusted ordinary gross income, and the dividends for the year > the
amount by which d h e r passive income exceeds 10% of the ordinary
gross income.
Adjusted Ordinary Gross Income (AOGI) = Gross Income less:
(1) capital gains and 8 1231(b) gains, and
(2) depreciation, property taxes, etc., allocable to rents.
If the stock ownership requirement is met, a corporation's status as a personal holding
company will depend upon whether or not PHCVAOGI 260%.Assuming that the corporation's groas income consists entirely of interest income from real estate and that there are
no applicable adjustments in arriving a t AOGI, gross income = AOGI. If the interest is
considered ordinary interest it is classified as PHCI. Thus, PHCVAOGI = 100%and the
corporation is a personal holding company.
16. Assuming again that interest income is the corporation's only income, the classification of the interest as rents removes it from the personal holding company income
classification because the rents, being equal to AOGI, exceed 50% of AOGI. Therefore,
PHCI = 0 and PHCVAOGI = 0%. The corporation is not considered a personal holding
company.
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interpret section 543(b)(3).This Comment suggests a third alternative-a revision of section 543(b)(3).
Such a revision would better achieve the purposes for which
the section was originally intended and would provide a safeguard
against the inappropriate application of the personal holding
company tax to real estate leasing companies forced to divest.

II. LEGISLATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
OF PERSONAL
HOLDING
COMPANY
PROVISIONS

A. Early Attempts to Reach Tax Avoidance Corporations
Since the early revenue statutes enacted at the close of the
Civil War," Congress has employed various measures in an attempt to tax wealthy individuals who permit their income to
accumulate in a corporation instead of receiving it personally.
During the early part of this century, wealthy individuals exploited the use of this tax avoidance device because the flat corporate tax rates were lower than the high levels of the graduated
tax on individual income.18
The sixteenth amendment, passed in 1913, empowered Congress to tax income "from whatever source derived."19 The first
revenue act passed subsequent to this amendment allowed taxation of income to the shareholders of a corporation whether or not
corporate income accumulated by the corporation was distributed to the shareholder^.^^ This practice continued until 1920,
when the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Macom ber2I cast
serious constitutional doubt upon the validity of taxing undistributed corporate income to shareholders. Consequently, section
220 of the Revenue Act of 1921omitted this provision and instead
taxed surplus accumulated to avoid the surtax on individual income.22
Under section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921, use of a holding company was prima facie evidence of a design to escape the
tax on individual^.^^ This presumption could be rebutted, however, by proving the accumulation was reasonable in view of cor17. E.g., Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, O II(A)(2),38 Stat. 114; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173,
4 2, 13 Stat. 223 as amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469.
18. See Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,530 (1978); H.R. REP.NO.1860,75th

Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938).
19. U S . CONST.amend XVI.
20. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, 5 II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114.
21. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
22. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, @ 220, 42 Stat. 227.
23. Id.
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porate needs? Subsequent personal holding company provisions
have retained two aspects of section 220: (1) an additional penalty tax above normal tax rates for corporations, and (2) a tax on
holding companies employed to avoid the individual tax?
Section 220, however, was insufficient to inhibit the diversion of personal income from wealthy individuals to various incorporated devices, commonly known as incorporated pocketbooks,
incorporated yachts, incorporated talents, or incorporated country estates? The basic scheme of these devices, later called personal holding companies, was explained by Congressman Doughton:
[A] number of wealthy individuals have organized personal
holding companies and have transferred to such companies their
houses, yachts, or other property used for their purely personal
enjoyment, along with sufficient income-producing assets to
produce enough revenue to pay the running expenses of such
property. To proviae a background of reality for this obviously
fictitious transaction the stockholder pays his holding company
a normal rental for the use of such estate or yacht.27

As the Commissioner could not always prove that these incorporated devices were unreasonably accumulating income for
evasion of individual income taxes, the need to effectively eliminate this tax avoidance instrument became apparent to Congress." Accordingly, the House of Representatives, in 1928, proposed separate tax provisions for personal holding companies.
The proposal defined personal holding companies as corporations
whose income from royalties, dividends, rents, interest, annuities, or sales of securities amounted to more than eighty percent
of the annual corporate income and whose stock was owned directly or indirectly by ten or fewer individual^.^^ The Senate rejected this detailed definition as arbitrary because corporations
t h a t appeared to unreasonably accumulate earnings could be
penalized even though in actuality they were appropriately build24. Subsequent case law interpreted "prima facie evidence" as presumptive evidence. See United States v. R.C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336, 337 (6th Cir. 1935).
This provision exists in the current Code and has been termed a "rebuttable presumption"
by the Supreme Court. Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 628 (1975).
25. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, Q 220, 42 Stat. 227.
26. See B. BIT~KER
& J. EUSTICE,FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS
AND
SHAREHOLDERS
18.20 (1971 ed.).
27. 81 CONG.REG.9019 (1937).
28. See American Package Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 413,416 (4th Cir. 1942);
Federal Legislation, The 1937 "Tax Loophole" Act: Purpose (pt. I), 26 GEO.L.J. 380,39293 ( 1937).
29. H.R. REP. NO. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1928).
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ing a surplus for later business necessities." Since receipts from
federal taxes and tariffs exceeded government expenditures during this period, the Senate may not have sensed a need for stricter
tax legi~lation.~'

B. Statutory Enactment
1. The Revenue Act of 1934
There was a drastic change in the fiscal conditions of the
country between 1928 and 1934; the Great Depression stunned
the country. Emergency expenditures by the federal government
to subsidize employment programs and stimulate the economy
caused large deficits in the federal accounts.32Accordingly, the
Revenue Act of 1934 was designed to increase revenues by preventing tax avoidance.33
One of the tax evasion devices that Congress most desired to
eliminate was the domestic personal holding companyY Congress
considered the incorporated pocketbook to be the most prevalent
form of tax a v o i d a n ~ e .Since
~ ~ the individuals employing these
schemes were usually in the best position to pay the most taxes,
Congress was particularly motivated to curb this tax avoidance
device.
The 1934 House proposal for meeting this need paralleled its
suggested 1928 personal holding company provisions. The Senate
30. S. REP.NO.960,70th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1928).
31. The surplus accumulated by the Treasury Department was reported accordingly:
Year

Surplus (in millions)

$309
505
250
377
635
455 (estimated)
274 (estimated)
See H.R. REP. NO. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1928).
32. The government had a large increase in emergency expenditures during the years
of the depression. The deficit for the fiscal year 1933 was $2.6 billion, and in 1934 the
estimated deficits for 1934 and 1935 (exclusive of debt retirement) were $7.3 billion and
$1.99 billion, respectively. See S. ReP. NO. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934); H.R RBP.
No. 704 ( pt . I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). It is therefore apparent why the Congress of
1934 was concerned over any reputed form of tax avoidance.
33. H.R. REP.NO.704 (pt. I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
34. Id. at 11-12.
35. Id.
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accepted the House proposal with one important exception. The
House had included rents as part of personal holding company
income, but the Senate, fearing actively operating family real
estate businesses would be classified as personal holding companies, excluded rents from personal holding company income?
Unlike the 1921 provisions taxing accumulated earnings, the
personal holding company tax did not permit a company to prove
that its retention of surplus earnings was reasonable in light of
business nece~sities.~'
Indeed, the personal holding company provisions were meant to work "automatically" because Congress in
1934 believed that the tax would only reach corporations formed
for the sole purpose of avoiding the surtax.38
2. The Revenue Act of 1937

The Senate's desire to protect bona fide operating real estate
companies apparently did not enjoy continued support after President Franklin D. Robsevelt made a emphatic speech condemning
tax avoidance through personal holding companies." Because it
was believed that personal holding companies were using minimal amounts of rental income to cover substantial passive investment income, personal holding company income was expanded to
include rents? Based on the arbitrary assumption that the rental
income of "bona-fide and legitimate operating companies" would
36. The Senate report stated,
While agreeing with the general method proposed in the House bill to remedy
this situation, i t is believed that section 102 of the House bill, dealing with
personal holding companies imposes a heavy penalty on many companies which
do not properly fall into the classification of the "incorporated pocketbook."

..,

A great part of the real-estate business is done by small family corporations.
These partake more of the nature of operating companies than mere holding
companies. Your committee is of the opinion that it is unwise to include such
companies within the category of personal-holding companies. Therefore, the
word "rents" is omitted from the definition. . . .

....

The fact that some companies, such as real estate companies, have been
placed outside the scope of this provision does not result in a serious opportunity
for tax avoidance. Such companies, and, in fact, all other corporations, are still
subject to section 102 [the accumulated earnings provision] of the bill.
S. REP.NO. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1934).
37. One court stated Congress was attempting to foreclose the accumulated earnings
defense that the funds were legitimately accumulated. O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1941). See also Federal Legislation, supra note 28, a t
392-93.
38. H.R. REP.NO. 704 (pt. I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
39. See H.R. REP.NO. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
40. Id. a t 6.
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not be less than fifty percent of the gross income, rental income
was excluded from personal holding company income only if it
surpasssed fifty percent of the company's gross incomee41
This revenue Act marked one of the first congressional attempts to distinguish active from passive income in an industry
in which Congress recognized that both active and passive businesses could exist. The vague concept of passive income is generally understood to include dividends, annuities, interest, royalties, rents, and income from sales of stock and s e ~ u r i t i e sPassive
.~~
income is considered to be derived from passive investments requiring little or no management.43Active income includes other
types of income requiring active operation and management.
There are exceptions to this general statement, some of which
Congress has statutorily recognized. For example, the receipt of
interest from a small number of loans may represent passive income to a creditor, while numerous loans may produce the major
source of income for a finance or lending company.44A single
piece of rented or leased property may require little or no attention of a corporate owner and may represent only a side investment, but a large apartment complex may represent an active
operating company and may require the constant efforts of numerous employees to generate profits." Thus, protecting the active operating real estate business has presented a difficult problem to Congress since an active business may, due to statutory
imprecision, earn what is considered passive income.
3.

The Revenue Act of 1938

The language now incorporated in section 543(b)(3), referring to interest on debts from real estate held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business, originated with
the Revenue Act of 1938.46The accompanying House Report explained the change:
In order to relieve from the surtax imposed by Title IA of
the bill certain operating companies whose principal business
-

-

-

--

---

41. Id.
42. See Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1978); I.R.C. 4
1372(e)(5)(C).
43. See Rohida v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1972).
44. A lending or finance company is exempted from personal holding company status
under I.R.C. 6 542(C)(6), which is further limited by I.R.C. § 542(d).
45. Real estate companies with largely rental income are exempted from personal
holding company status through the adjustments in I.R.C. §§ 542(a)(2) and 543(b)(3).
46. Compare Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 5 403(g), 52 Stat. 447 (now I.R.C. JI
543(h)(3)) with Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 351, 49 Stat. 1648.
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consists in the development of real estate for sale, section 403
makes a change in the treatment of certain types of interest
. . . . This change will help those bona fide real estate operating companies which might otherwise find themselves subject to
the tax under Title IA of the bill in years in which, by reason of
an inactive market for the sale of real estate, the greater part of
their income is derived from interest on second mortgages on
property previously sold by them and from rent from property
leased pending its sale and the rents in themselves do not constitute 50 percent or more of gross income. Under the proposed
definition of "rents", such companies will not be classified as
personal holding companies.47

Evidently Congress did not contemplate the dilemma of a
real estate leasing company forced to sell its properties because
of an "inactive market." The House report does identify two
types of "bona fide real estate operating companies which might
otherwise find themselves subject to the tax": first, those "whose
principal business consists in the development of real estate for
sale," and second, those who receive rents from "property leased
pending its sale [when] the rents in themselves do not constitute
50 percent or more of gross income." Neither of these descriptions
adequately provides protection for the financially troubled real
estate leasing company. Perhaps Congress did not foresee that a
bona fide real estate leasing company could, upon sale of its
properties, find itself subject to the tax. It is also possible that
Congress intended to exempt real estate leasing companies forced
to liquidate from personal holding company status. At the time
such companies decide to sell their real estate, it could be considered as "property leased pending its sale."
Upon enacting the predecessor to section 543(b)(3),Congress
apparently anticipated the possibility that a recessive market
might cause an otherwise active company to be classified as a
personal holding company. Congress, however, did not foresee
and provide for all the situations in which a personal holding
company would result from market fluctuations.

C. Subsequent Development-Numerous Exceptions
The language used in the Revenue Act of 1938 to qualify
certain interest on real estate debts as rents was incorporated in
subsequent acts and codes without substantial change.lThere
47. H.R.REP. NO.1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 51 (1938).
48. Compare Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, fi 403(g), 52 Stat. 447 (now 'I.R.C. 4
543(b)(3)) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, fi 502(g), 53 Stat. 1 and I.R.C. SI 543(b)(3).
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have been numerous refinements, however, in other provisions of
the personal holding company tax designed to avoid taxing active
companies not within the original congressional intent. The Revenue Act of 1934 recognized an exception for banks, life insurance
companies, and surety companies, even though these institutions
acquired income that could technically be classified as passive so
as to otherwise invoke the personal holding company provision^.^^
Furthermore, one critic recently noted a procession of a t least
eighteen supplicants from various industries and businesses that
have been granted relief from the overly broad personal holding
company provision^.^^ He concluded this "endless parade" indicates "[tlhe personal holding company tax, despite the intent of
Congress, is fundamentally defective in failing adequately to
shield active businesses from its impa~t."~'
49. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 4 351(b)(l), 48 Stat. 680. Concerning the present
major statutory exemptions, one treatise comments:
Generically, these exempted corporations are corporations which receive personal holding company income but are not considered to be within the concept
of incorporated pocketbooks because they receive such income as a result of
carrying on an active trade or business. Corporations exempted on this basis
include banks, life insurance companies, surety companies, certain lending and
finance companies, and federally licensed small business investment companies.
T. NESS& E. VOGEL,TAXATION
OF THE CLOSELY
HELD
CORPORATION
4 6.1(a) (3d ed. 1976)
(footnote omitted).
fiO. Mr. Morgan has written:
From the inception of the personal holding company tax, banks, life insurance companies and surety companies were also recognized as active businesses,
and were excluded from the personal holding company provisions. Thereafter,
a steady procession of supplicants has been granted relief by Congress for comparable reasons: holders of mineral oil or gas royalties (in 1937), licensed personal finance companies (in 1938), affiliated groups of railroad corporations (in
1938), industrial banks and Morris Plan companies (in 1942), other small loan
companies and financing companies (in 1950), corporations renting property to
shareholders for use in an active commercial, industrial or mining enterprise (in
1950, retroactive to l945), domestic building and loan associations (l95l), shipping enterprises depositing amounts in Merchant Marine Act reserves (in 1954),
corporate affiliated groups generally (in 1954), corporations renting property to
shareholders but not having other significant personal holding company income
(in 1954), small business investment companies (in 1959), music publishers (in
1960), movie producers (in 1964 and again in 1976), securities dealers handling
U.S. government bonds (in 1964), manufacturers leasing their products and also
realizing related royalty income (1964 and again in 1966), corporate affiliated
groups with life insurance subsidiaries (in 1974), and franchisors [sic] leasing
the franchise and other property to shareholders for use in an active business
(in 1976). Congress, in aiding those afflicted, has repeatedly expressed the intention to keep active businesses out of personal holding company entanglements.
Morgan, supra note 3, at 241-44 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 244.
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A.

The Mechanical Approach to Personal Holding Company
Determination
Personal holding company provisions have been mechanically applied against the taxpayer without concern for harsh res u l t ~This
. ~ ~mechanical approach is reflected in the Tax Court's
Relying on legisladecision in Parkside, Inc. u. Cornrni~sioner.~~
tive history, the court pointed out that the statute was intended
to exempt only "bona fide real estate operating companies" and
was "strictly mechanical9'-applying without regard to corporate
intention~.~The
court implied the corporations could not be considered bona fide real estate operating companies because the
corporations were "merely leasing companie~."~~
No explanation
was given to indicate why leasing companies could not be considered bona fide real estate operating companies. The distinction
may have been trivial, yet the unexplained conclusion resulted in
a stiff seventy-percent tax.
In another case that arguably could have been decided for
the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that a company formed to buy
property for resale to others on easier terms did not fall within
section 543(b)(3) since the property was not technically held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
Thus, the receipt of interest from these sales resulted in the company being considered a personal holding company.J6
52. The Tax Court has stated that since the statute is designed to correct the serious
evil of the incorporated pocketbook, it must be strictly construed. Kurt Frings Agency,
Inc., 42 T.C. 472 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1965). See 320 E. 47th
St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1957); O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v.
Commissioner, 120 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1941); Bell Realty Trust v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 766, 775, aff'd mern., 546 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1976); Darrow v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 217, 221-22 (1975).
Justification for applying the tax automatically is found in the language of the 1934
House report which removed the Commissioner's burden of proving there was a purpose
to avoid surtaxes on individual income. H.R.REP.No. 704 (pt. I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1934). An addendum to the report, entitled "Additional Views of James A. Frear," leaves
little doubt there was stiff opposition to the passage of this entire bill. It was passed
without public hearings and was formulated by a small group of tax experts who differed
radically in their opinions. It was also reported that the Treasury "unqualifiedly differed"
with the personal holding company provisions proposed. Id. a t 43.
53. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 54 (1973), rev'd, 571 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 61.
55. Id.
-56. Sieh v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1386 (1971), aff'd mem., 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-694 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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Although Congress apparently intended that the personal
holding company tax be levied in an automatic fashion, courts
have seldom noted Congress' subsequent interest in protecting
active corporations. Congress' intent to protect active companies
has not been broadly stated, but is nonetheless clearly evident in
most of the personal holding company provisions enacted since
1937. The numerous exceptions included in these provisions represent a response to the cry of active companies caught in the
personal holding company trap. Indeed, the provisions for excluding rents when they constitute more than fifty percent of the
adjusted ordinary gross income was based on the premise that
active companies would thereby be pr~tected.~'

B. Application of Section 1221 Criteria
Since the language of section 1221(1)58is similar to the language of section 543(b)(3), some courts have looked to section
1221(1) cases for guidance." The Ninth Circuit in Parkside, how57. H.R. REP.NO. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937).
58. Under (i 1221 of the current Code all properties are considered capital assets with
certain listed exceptions. Among the listed exceptions is "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." I.R.C. §
1221(1). Since the gains on capital assets are taxed a t a lesser rate than ordinary gains,
taxpayers normally urge the courts to construe the capital asset exceptions narrowly. The
statutory capital gains provisions for corporations are codified a t I.R.C. § 1201(a), while
the provisions applicable to individuals are codified in I.R.C. $8 120l(b) and 1202. Prior
to the Revenue Act of 1924 the capital asset definition of § 1221(1) did not exclude
property "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business." See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227. Assets
constituting inventory were implicitly distinguished from capital assets because they were
sold to customers in the ordinary course of business. At that time, however, real property
held for sale to customers was not considered inventory and could thus be classified as a
capital asset. See Helen M. Dunigan, 23 B.T.A. 418 (1931), aff'd, 66 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir.
1933); Gilbert S. Wright, 22 B.T.A. 1045 (1931); Albert F. Keeney; 17 B.T.A. 560 (1929).
Legislative provisions were added in 1924 to constrict the capital asset definition and
exclude as a capital asset real estate held primarily for sale in the course of business.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 6 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253. This was intended to prevent tax
avoidance and add greater clarity to the classes of property excluded from the capital asset
definition. S. REP. NO. 398, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 122 (1924). In 1934, the words "to
customers" and "ordinary" were added to the definition. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §
117(b), 48 Stat. 680. Since 1934, similar language has been found in each major revenue
act and Code. Compare I.R.C. 8 1221(1) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, 6 117(a)(l),
53 Stat. 1; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 5 117(a)(l),52 Stat. 447; and Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, 8117(b), 49 Stat. 1648.
59. See Kent Indus. Corp., 25 T.C. 215, 219 (1955); Webster Corp., 25 T.C. 55, 60
(1955), aff'd per curium, 240 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957); Frederick Smith Enterprise Co., 6
T.C.M. (CCH) 595, 599 (1947), aff'd, 167 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1948).
Other courts construing 4 543(b)(3) have summarily found that the property was not
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business with little analysis
or reliance on other cases. See Sieh v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1386, 1390 (1971), aff'd
mem., 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-694 (8th Cir. 1973).
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ever, appears to be the first federal appellate court to explicitly
apply the section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3) without
m~dification.~"
The Parkside case demonstrates how section 1221(1) criteria
can be applied to section 543 to provide a needed avenue of relief
for companies that have unwittingly stumbled into the personal
holding company provisions. The court stated that since the language of section 1221(1) was similar to section 543(b)(3),section
1221(1) criteria could be adopted. The section 1221(1) criteria
used by the court were
"the length of holding of the property, the nature of the acquisition of the property, the frequency and continuity of sales over
an extended period of time, the nature and the extent of the
taxpayer's business, the activity of the seller about the property,
and the extent and substantiality of the transaction^."^^

Without indicating whether its analyisis was based entirely on
the foregoing factors, the court discussed other "indicia" that
were "sufficiently compelling to sway the balance" in favor of
Parkside and its sister c~rporation.'~
The court concluded the
taxpayers were in the business of selling duplexes and found the
Tax Court "clearly in error."" The Parkside opinion did not refer
to the legislative history of section 543(b)(3) although most courts
do so when determining personal holding company status.R4
While the Ninth Circuit conveniently circumvented the
harsh legislative intentions documented in the 1930's" and was
60. 571 F.2d a t 1094.
61. Id. a t 1096 (quoting Los Angeles Extension Co. v. United States, 315 F.2d 1, 3
(9th Cir. 1963)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,530-31 (1978); Commissioner v. LaneWells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 221 (1944); Doehring v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 945, 947 (8th
Cir. 1975); Bayou Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850, 853-54 (5th Cir. 1971);
Hilldun Corp. v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1969); Frelbro Corp. v.
Commissioner, 315 F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1963); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner,
243 F.2d 894, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1957); Frederick Smith Enterprise Co. v. Commissioner, 167
F.2d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1948); O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 845, 84749 (2d Cir. 1941); Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206, 208-10 (1st Cir. 1939); Irving Berlin
Music Corp. v. United States, 487 F.2d 540, 547-48 (Ct. C1. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U . S .
832 (1974); Fidelity Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 483, 489 (1970), aff'd
mem., 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5751 (4th Cir. 1971); Callan v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1514, 1519
(1970), aff 'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1973); Jos. K., Inc., 51 T.C. 584, 596-98
(1969); Coshocton Secs. Co., 26 T.C. 935,939 (1956); Kent Indus. Corp. 25 T.C. 215, 21819 (1955).
65. One court recognized the unfortunate results of this legislative period when the
facts of the case caused a company to fall within the personal holding company trap. "It
is true that the result in this particular case is undoubtedly a hardship such as Congress
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able to successfully rescue a troubled company from the personal
holding company trap, it is doubtful whether section 1221(1) criteria can be relied upon in the future to resolve section 543(b)(3)
questions. Although extensive litigation involving section 1221(1)
has identified numerous criteria for determining whether property is held as a capital asset, it is difficult to distill clear and
consistently applied criteria." One court in apparent exasperation with this subsection stated, "Finding ourselves engulfed in
a fog of decisions with gossamer like distinctions, and a quagmire
of unworkable, unreliable, and often irrelevant tests, we take the
route of ad hoc exploration to find ordinary in~ome."'~
One commentator bemoaned the fact that "any attempt to reconcile the
cases in this area would likely produce nothing more than an
exercise in futility."" Reconciliation of section 1221(1) criteria is
not within the scope of this Comment; rather, the effect of applying the criteria from this ambiguous section of the Code to section
543(b)(3) is considered.
may not have had in mind in enacting the statute. However, it is the type of hardship
which sometimes follows an attempt to remedy a serious evil by drastic measures. "Cedarburg Canning Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1945) (emphasis added).
One author has noted that the "New Dealers" had a "political passion" to eliminate
holding companies because of the expansive control they often maintained over the economy. See Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dividends 6 (June 7, 1978) (unpublished report prepared for the American Bar Association, Section of Taxation: Committee
on Affiliated and Related Corporations).
66. In speaking of the capital gains definition, which is dependent upon the capital
asset definition in I.R.C. 8 1221, one commentator has noted:
The income tax provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code represent.
probably the most complex revenue law ever enacted in the fiscal history of any
country. The subject singly responsible for the largest amount of complexity is
the treatment of capital gains and losses. And the factor in that treatment which
is accountable for the resulting complexity is the definition of capital gain and
of capital loss.
Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV.L. REV. 985,
( 1956).
For examples of courts struggling with the capital gains definition in the sale of land,
see Malat v. Riddell, 383 U S . 569 (1966); Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526
F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1977); International Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1974); Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915
(Ct. C1. 1968); S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966). For a discussion of factors affecting courts
LAWINSTITUTE,DISCUSSION
in their analysis of capital gains in land sales, see AMERICAN
DRAFT
OF A STUDY
OF DEFINITIONAL
PROBLEMS
IN CAPITAL
GAINSTAXATION
21-27, 33-35, 61,
TAXFACTORS
71-72, 92-96 (1960); P. ANDERSON,
IN REALESTATEOPERATIONS
1-7 (1973); J.
HIC&MS,THETAXCONSEQUENCES
OF THE SALEOF LAND1-7 (1973); 3B J. MERTENS,THE
LAWOF FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION
44 22.15, .138-.142, .144, .I45 (rev. ed. 1973).
67. United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1969).
68. Libin, "Transactions Entered into for Profit," "Regular Trade or Business,"
andlor "Investment ":Some Distinctions and Differences, 27 N.Y.INST. FED.TAX.1209,
1213 (1969).
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Application of section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3)
can be advantageous to the taxpayer. The ambiguity and flexibility of section 1221(1) can be employed by courts to temper the
mechanical application of the personal holding company tax.
Indeed, the flexibility of section 1221(1) may represent the judicial answer to the plight of uncautious corporations caught within
the snare of the personal holding company provisions.
In Parkside both the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court relied
upon section 1221(1) cases to analyze the application of section
543(b)(3). For example, when both courts considered the fact that
the sales had actually occurred during a liquidation of assets,
both cited cases determined under section 1221(1)." The Tax
Court found insufficient sales activity for Parkside to be considNinth
ered a dealer or in the business of selling real e~tate.~VJ?he
Circuit, however, held that these sales in the course of a liquidation involved property technically held for sale in the ordinary
The ambiguity of section 1221(1)often causes
course of bu~iness.~'
contrary results in similar transactions because, as the Ninth
Circuit stated, "In the final analysis, each case must be decided
upon its o w n ' f a ~ t s . " ~ ~
The flexibility' of section 1221(1) is further demonstrated by
contrasting Parkside with Heller Trust v. Commis~ioner.~:~
In
Heller Trust, the taxpayer had built and rented duplexes that
after a few years proved unprofitable. The duplexes were subsequently advertised and sold by independent agents. Although the
taxpayer sold his 169 duplexes over a three-year period, he
claimed the profits were entitled to capital gains treatment because they resulted from liquidation of investment property and
not a sales business. The court agreed and decided that the duplexes were held as an investment until just prior to the time of
sale. Gain from a sale prompted by liquidation of investment
property was classified as a capital gain because the property was
not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business. Even though Heller Trust and Parkside involved similar factual circumstances, the Ninth Circuit was able to reach
opposite conclusions by construing the flexible criteria of section
1221(1)differently.
Thus, courts that apply section 1221(1) to section 543(b)(3)
may be able to grant relief to unwary corporations that have
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See 571 F.2d at 1096; 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 59-60.
34 T.C.M.(CCH) at 59-60.
571 F.2d at 1096.

Id.
382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
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stumbled into the personal holding company provisions. However, the danger always exists that the flexibility and ambiguity
of section 1221(1) may be used to defeat the valid claims of the
taxpayer .74
Applying section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3) may
present serious problems for the corporation attempting to plan
its activities in order to avoid the personal holding company tax.
A company should be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty
whether it will become subject to a seventy-percent tax. Because
of the uncertain future provided by section 1221(1), the company
may choose to cease operations and terminate employees, thereby
depriving the community of any benefits otherwise provided.
In addition, both the object and focus of section 1221(1) are
different than those of section 543(b)(3). Substitution of one section's interpretation for the other may be inappropriate. Section
1221(1) was incorporated into the Code to prevent tax avoidance
by constricting the advantageous capital gain treatment to a limited category of assets. Section 1221 focuses on the character of
the asset and seeks to provide favorable treatment to gains that
accrue due to the passage of time.'The section 543(b)(3) exception to personal holding company income, however, was designed
to broaden the category of corporations exempt from personal
holding company status by providing relief to certain real estate
businesses that would otherwise be classified as personal holding
companies. This provision focuses on the character of the corporation and the type of income earned.76Finally, because section
74. Another disadvantage for taxpayers when 6 1221(1) is used to interpret !
I
543(b)(3) is that taxpayers may tend to make inconsistent reports on their returns. Large
gains from property may inadvertently be reported as capital gains. By claiming capital
gain rates on their tax returns, taxpayers may be precluded from later denying capital
asset status. See In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1402 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); Maletis v. United
States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952). Thus, the taxpayer will be forced, because of the
similar language currently used in the two sections, to admit the property was not held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
In an unusual fashion, Parkside had reported its duplexes as ft 1231(b)(2)(B)property
(property not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or
business), which would have qualified for capital gains treatment. However, it had paid
the normal tax rate. The Ninth Circuit noted a "disquieting inconsistency" in the Commissioner's assertion that Parkside could not later deny the ft 1231(b)(2)(B)reporting,
while the Commissioner had not previously refunded the excess tax. The court sustained
Parkside's claim that the entry on the tax return was merely "inadvertent." See 571 F.2d
at 1096-97.
75. See Simmons & O'Hara, Three New Tests Appear for Obtaining Capital Gains
on Heal Estate Sales, 28 J. TAX. 218 (1968).
76. See Kent Indus. Corp., 25 T.C. 215, 218-19 (1955); Webster Corp., 25 T.C. 55,
60-61 (1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957); West End Co., 23 T.C. 815, 819-20 (1955).
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1221(1) pertains to a broader category of assets than section
543(b)(3),a court could choose criteria from section 1221(1)cases
to construe section 543(b)(3) that may include factors not relevant in evaluating whether a corporation has been sufficiently
involved in real estate sales activities to be classified as a business. Thus, there may be appropriate objections to an unmodified
application of section 1221(1) to section 543(b)(3).

IV. STATUTORY
REVISION
Although temporary relief from the oppressive personal holding company tax may be afforded real estate leasing companies
through the application of section 1221(1) criteria to section
543(b)(3), the continued use of this approach may only create
additional uncertainties in this already complex area of taxation.
On the other hand, if the personal holding company provisions
are to be mechanically applied, the mechanism should be adjusted and refined so that the tax is levied only on corporations
that are clearly passive or designed to avoid surtaxes on individuals. This ultimate relief must come from Congress.

A. Deficiencies in the Present Personal Holding Company
Provisions
The exceptions to personal holding company status tend to
be tailored and narrow in scope since most have been granted
after business and industry protest. Three of these exceptions are
relevant to an analysis of troubled real estate companies, and
include the exception for real estate leasing companies with large
rental income,77the exception for companies that principally sell
real estate,7Rand the exception granted certain finance or lending
cornpanie~.~~
A problem arises when a company that clearly falls
within the first exception is forced to sell its property. After the
sales, the company probably appears most similar to a lending or
finance company because it will be forced to manage debts and
collect an extensive amount of interest. Yet, because of the stringent requirements of the third limited exception, the company
may not qualify. Thus, the company can only be extricated from
The Tax Court in Parkside followed this approach by noting the "overall picture" of
Parkside to show that this situation was a liquidation of inherited property. 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 59.
77. I.R.C. fj 543(a)(2) provides this exception by excluding rental income when it is
more than 50% of the adjusted ordinary gross income.
78. See I.R.C. 4 543(a)(2), (b)(3).
79. See I.R.C. 4 542(c)(6), (d).
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personal holding company status by fitting in the second category. Some stretching of the language of the second exception is
required in order to find that a company that previously only
leased and rented property now sells the property in the ordinary
course of business. The availability of section 1221(1) for stretching the language has, therefore, not been unnoticed.
In Parkside, the corporations shifted from the first exception
to a position actually closer to the third-finance and lending
companies. The gradual change of Parkside from a rental company to a finance company was accompanied by a change in the
type of income received after the duplexes were sold. While the
monthly income Parkside received for the duplexes sold on installment contracts may have been nearly equal to the rental
payments i t had received prior to the sales, the label of the
company's income shifted from rental income to debt payments.
The activities of Parkside's president also illustrate how the character of the company shifted slightly from a rental business to
include the services of a lending or finance company. The president associated with mortgage officers and members of financial
institutions to stay abreast of developments and possible loan
sources, kept close financial record of payments to Parkside,
studied the Wall Street Journal along with various government
and private financial publications and statistics, and continued
to offer services to the duplex purchasers as a consultant to assist
them in their other purchases." Although Parkside resembled a
finance company, the Ninth Circuit employed section 1221(1)
criteria to characterize Parkside as a company doing business
within the second exception.
The court implicitly recognized that the personal holding
company exceptions and the policies supporting them do not
clearly manifest an intent to tax real estate leasing companies
forced to liquidate holdings and receive interest on debts due to
market inactivity. Most leasing companies forced to liquidate
desire to retain their corporate identity and established good will
in hopes of returning to the rental business when a better rental
market returns. In Parkside, for example, it may have been necessary to retain corporate status to avoid personal liability of the
shareholders because the corporation was still liable on the original mortgages for the duplexes sold?
Thus, a major deficiency with the personal holding company
provisions in the real estate leasing area is that the legislative
80. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 57-58.
81. Id. at 58.
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intent to exempt certain classes of companies has been unduly
limited. Recessive market forces may cause an active real estate
leasing company to fall outside the limited boundaries of one
exception and assume characteristics similar to active companies
within the other excepted categories. Yet, the company usually
will not be able to meet the technical qualifications of the other
personal holding company exceptions.
Another major deficiency of the personal holding company
tax is that it reaches many closely held corporations even though
the shareholders are not wealthy individuals seeking to avoid the
personal income tax. The seventy-percent personal holding company tax is equal to the highest tax levied on individual income.x2
This is consistent with the rationale of the personal holding company provisions; the provisions tax corporations created by
wealthy individuals to improperly avoid the highest levels of the
individual income tax. This rationale, however, does not support
the Tax Court's finding in Parkside. During the years in question,
Parkside's president averaged an annual salary of approximately
$7,000,A a salary comparable to that received by janitors, watchmen, and guards in the same area a t that time.u4Ironically, a tax
once aimed at wealthy individuals who amassed millions of dollars in the 1920's can now be employed to reach individuals receiving $7,000 from a small, debt-ridden corporation.

B. Revision of See tion 543(b)(3)
1. Shifting the emphasis
Without attempting a massive restructuring of section
513(b)(3), operating companies with rental and interest income
could be appropriately protected from personal holding company
status through a change in the wording of the section. By deleting
"primarily?' and adding "active," the adjusted income from rents
would include
interest on debts owed to the corporation, to the extent such
debts represent the price for which real property held primwihy
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of an active trade
or business was.sold or exchanged by the corporation . . . .

Under this proposed statute, the emphasis would shift from determining whether the property is held primarily for sale, to iden82. See I.R.C. 8 1.
83. The president's annual salary in 1966, 1967, and 1968 was $6,300, $7,300, and
$7,200, respectively. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 57, 61.
84. Id. at 57.
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tifying legitimately operating businesses. In interpreting section
1221(1) courts have normally concentrated on whether property
is held primarily for sale? This detracts from focusing on the
nature of the corporation, which is a more appropriate basis for
analysis under section 543(b)(3).
The Supreme Court has held that "primarily" as used in
section 1221(1) means "of first importance" or "prin~ipally."~"f
this word were deleted," decreased emphasis would be placed on
whether the property was held in the ordinary course of a business
since at the same time the property could be held for other significant purposes. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Parkside in effect
decreased the importance of "primarily" by limiting its application to "the relevant tax years."nxObviously, during the years of
the sales or immediately thereafter the court could easily find
t h a t the property was held primarily for sale. Deletion of
"primarily" from section 543(b)(3) similarly would direct focus
away from the holding of the asset and toward the nature of the
corporation.
Drawing from other sections of the Code: The active business
criterion

2.

The addition of "active" to section 543(b)(3) would emphasize the type of business to be excluded from classification as a
personal holding company. The requirement of an active trade or
business for favorable tax treatment has been employed in other
sections of the Code and could be appropriately used in section
543(b)(3). The foreign personal holding company provisions employ this criterion and exclude rents "derived in the active conduct of a trade or business"" from foreign personal holding company income. The rents are treated as receipts from an active
business when the lessor has produced, acquired, or substantially
added to the real estate; participated in active and substantial
management and operational functions related to the real estate;
85. One recent case that emphasized the manner in which the property was held is
Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, 539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976). "[Ilt is the
taxpayer's primary purpose in holding that property a t the time of sale which determines
whether the gain therefrom will qualify as capital gains or be taxed as ordinary income."
Id. at 315 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit in Parkside took the same approach. 571
F.2d at 1096.
86. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U S . 569, 572 (1966).
87. See Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REV.1093
(1968). This article discusses the undesirable effect Malat had on 5 1221(1) case law and
suggests legislative elimination of "primarily" to remedy this effect.
88. 571 F.2d a t 1096.
89. I.R.C. (i 954(c)(3)(A).
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or rented the property only because it is temporarily idle in his
normally active trade or business.g0Other provisions for foreign
personal holding companies exclude certain forms of interest
when received through an active business.g1
Section 355(b), in the setting of divisive corporate reorganizations, attempts to distinguish "the active conduct of a trade or
business" from the passive conduct of a business. One important
test employed in this section is whether the business has been
actively conducted for the past five yeamg2A determination is
also made whether the corporation is presently engaged in active
busine~s.~"

The "downright confis~atory"~~
personal holding company
tax should not be arbitrarily exercised without regard to the status of the taxpayer as an active corporation. Present personal
holding company provisions are the product of the vindictive
surge of the 1930's to eliminate holding companies and tax avoidance corporations. The provisions are not the result of a moderate, carefully calculated analysis of the personal holding company problem.
The tax is particularly oppressive for real estate leasing companies forced to liquidate as a result of a depressed market economy. In Parkside v. Commissioner, the court used the extensively
litigated, yet flexible criteria of section 1221(1) to rescue the corporations. Today, the personal holding company mechanism
needs refinement and consistency to avoid sweeping innocent corporations within its grasp. Modification of the personal holding
company mechanism, by changing section 543(b)(3) so that the
major determination would be whether the company can be considered active would noticeably improve its application.

Stephen C. Fuller
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